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HOW DEVOLVED IS TOO DEVOLVED?: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS EXAMINING THE
ALLOCATION OF POWER BETWEEN STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE
LENS OF THE CONFEDERATE MONUMENT
CONTROVERSY
W. Davis Riddle
At various critical junctures in our nation’s history,
lawmakers have struggled to strike the proper balance
between centralization and delegation of authority.
Recently, the debate over whether to remove
Confederate monuments has again brought to the fore
this centuries-old struggle. Beginning in 2000, state
legislatures throughout the South enacted statutes
primarily designed to protect Civil War monuments,
which in the South predominantly pay tribute to the
Confederate cause. Recent attempts by Southern
localities to remove Confederate monuments have
revealed the inadequacy of these recently-enacted
statutes. Virtually every state legislature that has
successfully passed a statute on the topic has produced
a law that entirely prohibits removal of Confederate
monuments by localities, save certain extreme
exceptions. Conversely, in those states where no statute
addresses the issue of removal, the decision is left
entirely to individual localities, as state officials have
no legal authority on the matter. Both arrangements
fail to provide for the proper allocation of authority
between state and local government. In failing to do so,
the respective governmental responses fall short in
realizing the attendant policy benefits of proper
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allocation of authority. The statutory responses of two
states, Georgia and Kentucky, provide a useful lens
through which to analyze the effects of improper
allocation of authority and, on the other hand, to
consider the potential benefits of the proper allocation
of authority. In light of these considerations, this Note
suggests a model statutory approach that provides a
process for both protection and removal of Confederate
monuments and, by striking the proper balance, allows
for meaningful political engagement at both the state
and local level.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"With the terrorist attack, these monuments were transformed
from equestrian statues into lightning rods.” – Charlottesville,
Virginia Mayor Mike Signer.1
A. TENSIONS COME TO A HEAD

Recent events and controversies in the South concerning
Confederate monuments have brought to light centuries-old social
tensions, compelling state and local authorities to search for the
proper policy response.2 These tensions are the product of years of
repugnant racial beliefs and policies, and the intermittent
attempts to rectify these evils.3 Pivotal moments throughout
American history—such as the Civil War, the second-era Ku Klux
Klan of the 1920s,4 and the Civil Rights Movement5—have
resulted from such tensions and contribute to modern-day
perspectives on racial issues. Today, these tensions remain. As one
black American from Mississippi put it: “What’s happening in
Charlottesville, that’s not shocking. That’s been happening.
1 Erik Ortiz, Charlottesville Mayor Changes Position, Agrees with Confederate Statue
Removal, NBC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2017, 3:37 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/charlottesville-mayor-changes-position-agrees-confederate-statue-removal-n793931.
2 See Cleve R. Wootson Jr., In the Wake of Charlottesville Protests, a Kentucky Mayor
Wants
to
Remove
Confederate
Statues,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
13,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/08/13/in-the-wake-ofcharlottesville-protests-a-kentucky-mayor-wants-to-remove-confederatestatues/?utm_term=.507b28fc2ac0 (“The [Charleston church shooting] tragedy mobilized
once-hesitant Southern cities to get rid of polarizing Civil War statuary.”).
3 See generally Richard Wolf, Equality Still Elusive 50 Years After Civil Rights Act,
USA TODAY, (Jan. 19, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/01/19/civil-rights-act-progress/4641967/ (discussing the strides that have been made
towards racial equality in the past fifty years, while acknowledging that racial inequality
still exists).
4 Ben Cosgrove, Bigotry in the USA: Photos From a Ku Klux Klan Initiation, TIME (Mar.
5, 2013) http://time.com/3746389/bigotry-in-the-usa-photos-from-a-ku-klux-klan-initiation
(“The KKK's fortunes as a cultural and political force have waxed and waned over the
decades, with Klan membership peaking in the 1920s, during the era of the ‘Second Klan.’”);
id. (noting that the “Klan claimed literally millions of members at the height of the Second
Klan era”).
5 CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2005),
https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/political-science-and-government/
political-parties-and-movements/civil-rights-movement (“The civil rights movement was a
struggle by African Americans in the mid-1950s to late 1960s to achieve civil rights equal to
those of whites . . . .”).
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Whether a statue is standing or a flag is waving, it’s been
happening. They just showing it on the news now.”6
It is undeniable that the past three to four years have seen a
renewed and intense public debate centered around Confederate
monuments, which many consider to be symbols of white
supremacy.7 This renewed attention can likely be traced to the
2015 murder of nine black churchgoers by a white supremacist in
Charleston, South Carolina.8 In the following days and months,
many leaders throughout the South called for removal of not only
flags but also prominent monuments erected in remembrance of
the Confederate cause.9 These calls sharply intensified in the fall
of 2017, after the tragedy in Charlottesville, Virginia, where a
white nationalist rally in opposition to a plan by the city to remove
a prominent statue of Confederate general Robert E. Lee escalated
into violence.10 Clashes between white nationalists and counterprotestors, left one dead and at least thirty-four people wounded.11
6 B. Brian Foster, Confederate Monuments are More than Reminders of our Racist Past.
They are Symbols of our Racist Present, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/08/24/confederate-monumentsare-more-than-reminders-of-our-racist-past-they-are-symbols-of-our-racistpresent/?utm_term=.efc043067622.
7 See, e.g., Miles Parks, Confederate Statues Were Built to Further a 'White Supremacist
Future', NPR (Aug. 20, 2017, 8:31 AM) http://www.npr.org/2017/08/20/544266880/
confederate-statues-were-built-to-further-a-white-supremacist-future (“‘These statues were
meant to create legitimate garb for white supremacy,’ [James] Grossman [executive
director of the American Historical Association] said. ‘Why would you put a statue of
Robert E. Lee or Stonewall Jackson in 1948 in Baltimore?’”).
8 See Kathleen Hennessey & Michael Muskal, South Carolina Church Killings Foster
Unity over Removal of Confederate Flag, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 2015, 9:46 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-charleston-shooting-confederate-flag-20150622story.html (“[O]n Monday, Gov. Nikki Haley and other leading officials called for the flag’s
removal, a… show of unity spawned by the deaths of nine people in a black church last
week during a massacre whose white suspect embraced the flag as a symbol of his racist
ideology.”).
9 See, e.g., Maya Rhodan, New Orleans Mayor Asks City to Remove Confederate Statues,
TIME (July 9, 2015), http://time.com/3952177/new-orleans-confederate-statues (“[New
Orleans Mayor Mitch] Landrieu formally asked the City Council to start the process to
remove four statues erected to honor Confederate leaders from their prominent positions
throughout the city . . . in the wake of the massacre at Emanuel AME Church in
Charleston, South Carolina.”).
10 See Maggie Astor, et al., A Guide to the Charlottesville Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-virginia-overview.html
(describing the Charlottesville protests and the events that followed).
11 Id.; see also Hawes Spencer, A Far-Right Gathering Bursts Into Brawls, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-protests-unite-theright.html?module=inline (“[A] car plowed into a crowd of counterdemonstrators, killing a
woman and injuring at least 19 other people.”).
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Two state troopers also died while monitoring the situation when
their helicopter crashed.12
B. THE MONUMENTS

As of 2016, there were approximately 718 Confederate
monuments and statues in a total of 31 states, with a total of 90
monuments in Georgia and 41 in Kentucky.13 In the absence of
controlling federal authority, state and local authorities are left to
their own devices to craft the proper policy response.14 Local
leaders faced with demands for monument removal are prompted
to first consider whether removal is the desired response.15 If
answering in the affirmative, these leaders must then consult the
proper legal process for effecting such removal.16 However, upon
deciding that removal is in fact the desired response, many of the
Southern leaders most inclined to act quickly to remove—officials
from more liberal cities and towns17—are, upon consultation of the
relevant legal processes, “reckoning with the fact that they don’t
actually have the power to [remove the monuments].”18

Id.
Booth Gunter & Jamie Kizzire, Whose Heritage? Public Symbols of the Confederacy,
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/
sites/default/files/com_whose_heritage.pdf.
14 See Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 61 (1891) (“When [Congress’ commercial]
power, or some other exclusive power of the federal government, is not in question,
the police power of the state extends to almost everything within its borders . . . .”); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
15 See generally Campbell Robertson & Richard Fausset, Southern Cities Split with
States on Social Issues, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/04/16/us/southern-cities-move-past-states-on-liberal-social-issues.html.
16 See discussion infra Part II.
17 See, e.g. id. (“Many of these [Southern] cities have found themselves increasingly at
odds with their states, and here in a region that remains the most conservative in the
country, the conflicts are growing more frequent and particularly pitched.”); see also Paul A.
Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2–Remedying the Urban Disadvantage through
Federalism and Localism, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (“[A]t least for those with progressive
political leanings, local government is often now seen as the most responsive and nimble
level of government in the United States . . . .”).
18 David A. Graham, Local Officials Want to Remove Confederate Monuments—But
States Won't Let Them, ATLANTIC (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/08/when-local-officials-want-to-tear-down-confederate-monuments-butcant/537351; see also David A. Graham, Red State, Blue City, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/red-state-blue-city/513857
(“Over
the past few years, city governments and state legislatures have fought each other in a
series of battles involving preemption . . . . It hasn’t gone well for the city dwellers.”).
12
13
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Beginning in 2000, state legislatures throughout the South
enacted statutes which protected war monuments, including
monuments dedicated to commemorating the Civil War (or the
“War Between the States” as many legislatures preferred to call
it).19 In the South, these monuments predominantly pay tribute to
the Confederate cause.20 Though these statutes vary considerably,
each contains a broadly-worded provision providing for protection
of these controversial Confederate monuments.21
Tennessee’s statute, the Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of
2016, typifies the language used in these statutes:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no
memorial regarding a historic conflict, historic entity,
historic event, historic figure, or historic organization
that is, or is located on, public property, may be
removed, renamed, relocated, altered, rededicated, or
otherwise disturbed or altered.22
This language clearly indicates that these statutes were passed in
response to concerns by Southern state legislatures that
Confederate monuments would become the subject of public
contempt and subsequent calls for removal.23

19 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-165 (2018) (prohibiting removal of monuments erected
in remembrance of the “War Between the States”).
20 See, e.g., id.; Alabama Memorial Preservation Act of 2017, ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-230 to 237 (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 171.780–.788 (West 2018); O.C.G.A § 50-3-1 (2018); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 100-2.1 (2018); Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of 2016, TENN. CODE ANN. §
4-1-412 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812 (2018).
21 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 171.780–.788 (West 2018) (not explicitly protecting
Confederate monuments but nonetheless providing a process for an object to be nominated
and designated as a “military heritage object,” with such designation now being used to
protect Confederate monuments); see also Kasi E. Wahlers, North Carolina's Heritage
Protection Act: Cementing Confederate Monuments in North Carolina's Landscape, 94 N.C.
L. REV. 2176, 2182 (2016) (“Although the Acts vary considerably, each contains a provision
for monument protection.”).
22 Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of 2016, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(b)(1) (2018).
23 As American legal scholar and professor Alfred Brophy put it: “[O]bviously [these
statutes are] about Confederate monuments — no one's taking down Vietnam or WWII
monuments.” Alfred Brophy, North Carolina Heritage Protection Act, THE FACULTY
LOUNGE (July 16, 2015), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/07/north-carolina-heritageprotection-act.html. But see Joe Sterling, A New Alabama Law Makes Sure Confederate
Monuments Are Here to Stay, CNN (May 26, 2017, 5:19 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2017/05/26/us/alabama-confederate-monuments-bill-trnd/index.html
(quoting
Alabama
Memorial Preservation Act of 2017 bill sponsor, Sen. Gerald Allen, as stating: “It's a piece of
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These concerns that Confederate monuments would be removed
due to public pressure were not without merit. In April 2017, the
Southern Poverty Law Center found that “at least 60 such publicly
funded symbols of the Confederacy have been removed since . . .
[2015 when] a white supremacist . . . kill[ed] nine black
parishioners at a church in Charleston, South Carolina.”24 The
statutes and the impetus behind their passage have come under
close scrutiny due to these recent tragic events.25 Additionally,
some politicians who supported the statutes have conceded that
they were passed in large part to protect Confederate monuments,
which has only served to amplify public awareness.26
Public discourse has naturally centered around whether
removal of these Confederate monuments is proper in light of their
controversial history.27 This Note does not seek to pass judgment
on the moral quandaries and arguments present with such a
deeply-rooted, emotional issue. Instead, this Note offers a
comparative look at how state statutes passed in the early 2000s
by Southern state legislatures, specifically those passed in
Kentucky and Georgia, affect local governments’ responses to the
Confederate monument controversy. While other states have also
passed statutes in response to the same controversy, Kentucky and
legislation that protects all of Alabama history. It doesn't only touch the Confederates. It
touches every facet of our state history.”).
24 Weekend Read: The State of the Confederacy in 2017, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW
CENTER (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2017/04/28/weekend-read-stateconfederacy-2017.
25 See Graham, Local Officials Want to Remove Confederate Monuments—but States
Won't Let Them, supra note 18; Jim Galloway, The Georgia Law that Protects Stone
Mountain, Other Confederate Monuments, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 17, 2017),
http://politics.blog.ajc.com/2017/08/17/the-georgia-law-that-protects-stone-mountain-otherconfederate-monuments (“William Reilly, the House clerk in the [Georgia] state Capitol,
reports that his office has been inundated with inquiries about the law that protects all
Confederate monuments in Georgia.”).
26 See, e.g., Joel Ebert, Tenn. House Votes for Heritage Protection Law, USA TODAY (Feb.
18, 2016, 6:12 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2016/02/18/tennesseeheritage-protection-act/80574928 (noting that “Majority Leader Gerald McCormick
conceded that [bill sponsor Rep. Steve] McDaniel drafted the bill after there was a
‘stampede to remove all vestiges of the old Confederacy’”).
27 Some believe that removal is necessary as the statues are constant reminders of a
shameful racial past and serve to promote white supremacy, while others believe the
monuments are important reminders of history and removal results in the “danger that
we’ll forget the connections of past racial crimes to current racial inequality.” Alfred L.
Brophy, Why Northerners Should Support Confederate Monuments, WASH. POST (July 14,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/07/14/why-northernersshould-support-the-preservation-of-conferederate-monuments/?utm_term=.054664aabc36.
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Georgia’s distinct approaches, historical understandings of the
relationship between state and local government, and recent
attempts to remove prominent Confederate monuments provide
the best lens for succinct and insightful comparison and analysis. 28
The Kentucky and Georgia statutes address the same issue in
different ways, have brought about different results, and have
both been the subject of calls for legislative reform.
This Note undertakes a comparative analysis of these two
statutes to show that the statutes fail to respect the authority
ordinarily delegated to localities, and thus fail in realizing the
attendant policy benefits of proper devolution of authority to
localities. In light of these inadequacies, this Note will argue that
legislatures should amend present statutes and craft future policy
to (1) allocate more authority to localities and (2) operate less as
complete prohibitions of removal or alteration of Confederate
monuments.
Part II will look at the bases of legal authority given to
localities in Kentucky and Georgia and the interplay between state
and local governments in those states on other, less controversial
issues. Part III will focus on differences between the Kentucky and
Georgia statutes that protect these monuments, and the process,
or lack thereof, set out by the statutes when removal of a
monument is proposed. Part III will also analyze the legal
processes required to remove monuments in certain other states
throughout the South and recent legal battles over removal. Part
IV of this Note will introduce recognized policy and legal
arguments and considerations related to delegation of authority to
28 See, e.g., Beth Musgrave & Jack Brammer, Lexington Council Wants Statues Moved.
Meet the Obscure Board That Could Overrule Them., LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Aug. 18,
2017, 4:39 PM), https://www.kentucky.com/news/local/counties/fayette-county/article
168036622.html (“Lexington’s leaders spoke with one voice Thursday about the need to
remove two Confederate statues from the grounds of the former Fayette County courthouse,
but the decision ultimately lies with a little-known state commission that meets twice a
year.”); Matthew Terrell, In Atlanta, Considering Which Confederate Monuments Should
Go, HYPERALLERGIC (Nov. 27, 2017), https://hyperallergic.com/413181/confederatemonuments-atlanta (“[Atlanta] Mayor Kasim Reed has formed a committee to make
recommendations on what to do with this city’s Confederate monuments.”); Harriet
Sinclair, Stone Mountain Confederate Memorial in Georgia Has to Go, Democrat
Gubernatorial
Candidate
Says, NEWSWEEK
(Aug.
18, 2017, 6:11 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/confederate-mountain-carving-must-go-georgiagubernatorial-candidate-says-651679 (“Stacey Abrams, the Democrat favorite candidate
for state governor, said the carvings should be removed following the weekend of violence at
a white nationalist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.”).
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localities in the United States. Part V will advocate for the
appropriate level of delegation to localities from the states,
arguing that statutes should allocate more authority to localities
at two critical stages: (1) when determining whether a particular
monument should be protected within the scope of the controlling
state statute and (2) determining whether a monument should be
removed.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF DELEGATION OF POWER FROM
STATE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN KENTUCKY AND GEORGIA
An understanding of how power is vested from state to local
governments lays the groundwork for state and local officials to
determine how they can, and should, respond to the monument
controversy. Historically, the “struggle for local control over public
decisions has characterized the American experiment in
democratic government.”29 It is not disputed that a state may
“fashion its basic law so as to grant home rule or self-government
to its municipal corporations.”30 Present within this proposition,
however, is a limitation: “[a] municipal corporation, in the exercise
of all of its duties, including those most strictly local or internal, is
but a department of the State.”31 Put differently, cities and
counties have no independent legal standing, but instead are fully
reliant on authority delegated from the state government either by
the state constitution or statute.32
The state government’s delegation of authority to a locality is a
concept known as “home rule.”33 Consideration of home rule
principles impacts the rule of law regarding many controversial
DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 1 (2001).
District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 108 (1953).
31 Id. (citing Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540, 544 (1875)); see also id. at 108–
09 (“[D]ecision after decision has held that the delegated power of municipalities is as broad
as the police power of the state, except as that power may be restricted by terms of the
grant or by the state constitution.”).
32 See KRANE ET AL., supra note 29, at 1 (“[A] right of home rule does not exist; rather,
legal theory in the United States declares local government to be the agent, creature, and
delegate of state government.”); DOUGLAS J. WATSON, ALA. STATE UNIV.: CENTER FOR
LEADERSHIP & PUB. POLICY, HOME RULE IN ALABAMA AND THE SOUTH 3 (2013) (“Local
governments are not mentioned in the United States Constitution, and, as a result, have no
independent standing in the fifty states beyond what state governments grant them.”).
33 See KRANE ET AL., supra note 29, at ix (“The term ‘home rule’ . . . [refers] to proposals
to amend state constitutions or pass state laws that would increase the power of local
governments . . . .”)
29
30
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social, political and economic issues, and, significantly, can “lead to
different outcomes in different states.”34 These different outcomes
are largely due to the fact that use of the term “home rule” is
varied, as scholars and courts have long struggled with its scope
and derivation.35 As home rule “takes many legal forms and
follows many models,”36 analysis of Georgia and Kentucky, two
Southern states which have distinct understandings of the
concept, will provide fertile ground to consider the benefits of
varying levels of delegation to localities. Additionally, an
understanding of the states’ respective views of home rule helps to
explain the differences between the legislative solutions passed by
the Kentucky and Georgia state legislatures in response to the
Confederate monument controversy.
Often, legal scholarship seeks to define the authority
delegated by states to localities as creating a relationship between
the two that makes a state either a “Dillon’s rule state” or a “home
rule state.”37 While an in-depth analysis of the respective
characteristics of these two classifications is beyond the scope of
this Note, the basic difference is noteworthy. In home rule states,
localities “are given latitude to solve problems or address issues,”
as long as they are not in conflict with a constitutional provision or
statute of the state.38 This structure provides for what is often
called “initiative autonomy.”39 In contrast, Dillon’s rule “permits
cities to act only when they can identify a relatively clear state law
delegation of power.”40 At a broader level of analysis, “home rule”

34 Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 256
(2004).
35 Id. at 253 (“Home rule is a complex topic. Home rule takes many legal forms and
follows many models . . . [and] is . . . controversial for both scholars and courts.”).
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., 1 JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW AND GROWTH MGMT. § 1:18 (2d ed.
2018) (“While some states restrict local power following Dillon's rule that local government
possesses only the powers and authority expressly and specifically delegated by the state
legislature, others following a home rule philosophy allow local exercise of all authority
exercisable by the state unless preempted by the state legislature through disabling
legislation.”).
38 WATSON, supra note 32, at 3.
39 Jonathan M. Kopcsik, Constitutional Law—Home Rule and Firearms Regulation:
Philadelphia's Failed Assault Weapons Ban—Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 152 (Pa.
1996), 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1055, 1058 (1997) (“Initiative autonomy enables
a home rule municipality to perform a wide range of functions without previous express
authorization from the state legislature . . . .”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
40 GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 139 (3d ed. 2001).
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is understood to encompass any delegation of authority to a
locality,41 and the term becomes relatively standardized to mean
simply that localities only have as much freedom and authority to
govern their affairs as the state gives them, however broad or
narrow.42 While acknowledging that the distinction between a
“home rule state” and “Dillon’s rule state” is a meaningful one at a
narrower level, for purposes of succinct analysis, the remainder of
this Note will use the term “home rule” in accordance with its
broader meaning, which effectively encompasses any delegation of
authority from a state to a locality, whatever its scope of
generality.43
Understanding home rule to encompass both general and
specific grants of authority, the delegations of authority to
localities by the state governments in Georgia and Kentucky
illustrate different views on the appropriate level of delegation via
home rule. Over the latter half of the twentieth century, both the
Georgia and Kentucky state legislatures amended their
constitutions to expressly provide that the legislature could allow
localities to self-govern.44 Each amendment sought to clarify—and
in some ways, establish—the origin of legal authority of home rule
in the state.45 Although both amendments were passed in response
to similar concerns, the statutory grants of authority given to
localities by the respective state legislature differed substantially.
Whereas the Kentucky home rule statute grants general powers
to localities in one sentence, Georgia’s legislature decided instead
to grant home rule powers to localities in specific areas, spanning

41 See KRANE ET AL., supra note 29, at ix (“[A]ny statute or constitutional provision that
enhances the authority and opportunities for a local jurisdiction to control its own affairs
can be considered as an effort to grant an additional degree of ‘home rule.’”).
42 See id. at 10 (need parenthetical).
43 See, e.g., id. (need parenthetical); Rick Su, Have Cities Abandoned Home Rule?, 44
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 181, 190 (2017) (“Home [r]ule defines the basic legal standing of local
governments and their relationship with the state.”).
44 See GA. CONST. Art. IX, § 2, ¶ II. (enacted in 1954); KY. CONST. § 156b. (enacted in
1994).
45 In Georgia, the 1954 amendment was a direct response to the ruling in Phillips v. City
of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72 (1953), where the Georgia Supreme Court struck down a general
statute passed by the legislature in 1951 granting powers to localities. KRANE ET AL., supra
note 29, at 104–05. In Kentucky, the 1994 amendment removed uncertainty about the
constitutionality of a broadly-worded 1980 statute which granted cities a version of home
rule. Id. at 166–67.
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eight statute subsections.46 Furthermore, in Kentucky, where the
key statutory limitation on home rule authority is that a municipal
regulation cannot be “in conflict with a constitutional provision or
statute,”47 there has been recent movement by the Kentucky
Supreme Court to provide more latitude to local governments.48
This small movement, however, should not engender the belief
that the Kentucky courts and legislature are overly deferential to
local legislation. In regard to city ordinances raising the minimum
wage, for example, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that “while
cities like Louisville and Lexington have broad authority under
home rule, the sovereignty of the state is supreme in the area of
minimum wage, where state law already exists.”49
While Kentucky home rule can be characterized as a
conservative yet progressing understanding of delegation to
localities, Georgia home rule is simply a conservative
understanding. Georgia courts continue to interpret grants of
authority to localities strictly, and its strict “constructionism” is
“reinforced by city and county attorneys who are generally
conservative and who prefer to see clear authorization in
writing.”50 In fact, under Georgia law, determining the validity of a
city ordinance is a two-step process. First, a court must determine
whether the local government possessed the power to enact the

46 Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 82.082 (West 2018) (“A city may exercise any power
and perform any function within its boundaries, including the power of eminent domain in
accordance with the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, that is in
furtherance of a public purpose of the city and not in conflict with a constitutional provision
or statute.”) with O.C.G.A. §§ 36-34-1 to -8 (2018) (containing specific subsections such as §
36-34-5.3, entitled “Leases for public zoos in certain counties”).
47 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 82.082 (West 2018).
48 See Lexington Fayette Cty. Food & Beverage Ass'n v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty.
Gov't, 131 S.W.3d 745, 750 (Ky. 2004) (“Local regulation is not always precluded simply
because the legislature has taken some action in regard to the same subject.”).
49 NICOLE DUPUIS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE
ANALYSIS 7 (2017), http://nlc.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/NLC%20Preemption%20Report%
202017.pdf (“[I]n 2016, the Kentucky Supreme Court struck down Louisville’s minimum
wage ordinance, ruling that the city does not have the authority to set a minimum wage
above the level set by the state. The ruling also invalidated an ordinance from the city of
Lexington that would have raised its minimum wage to $10.10 by 2018.”); see Kentucky
Rest. Ass'n v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov't, 501 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Ky. 2016)
(“[E]xpress preemption is not required when the General Assembly has enacted a
comprehensive statutory scheme.”).
50 KRANE ET AL., supra note 29, at 106; see also Kemp v. City of Claxton, 269 Ga. 173, 177
(1998) (“Municipal corporations are creations of the state, possessing only those powers that
have been granted to them, and allocations of power from the state are strictly construed.”).
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ordinance. If a court finds the power exists, then it must determine
whether the locality’s exercise of the power is “clearly
reasonable.”51 “Georgia's concept of home rule is . . . in line with
the national trend toward the limitation of local autonomy in favor
of state interests.”52
III. PASSAGE AND SUBSTANCE OF THE STATUTES THAT CONTROL
REMOVAL OF CONFEDERATE MONUMENTS
With these principles in mind, it becomes evident that the
respective actions of the Georgia and Kentucky legislatures in
response to the Confederate monument controversy were in
accordance with previous government policies concerning
delegation of authority from state to local governments. That is,
while the Georgia state legislature preferred to limit local
autonomy entirely in the favor of state interests, the Kentucky
state legislature sought to strike a balance, while still maintaining
substantial control at the state level.53 These statutes and
subsequent responses from citizens and local governments provide
examples of the respective home rule understandings of Georgia
and Kentucky in action and, in light of scholarship discussed in
Part IV, an opportunity to identify ways by which states can better
accomplish appropriate delegation of authority to localities.
A. GEORGIA’S STATUTE: O.C.G.A SECTION 50-3-1.

The passage of Georgia’s relevant statute makes clear the depth
of the issue and serves to forewarn future policymakers of the
complexity of legislating regarding the issue. In the 2001 Georgia
state legislative session, then-Governor Roy Barnes successfully
pushed for the replacement of the 1956 state flag which
prominently displayed the Confederate battle flag.54 Within the
bill that removed the Confederate battle flag from the Georgia

Porter v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 526, 526 (1989) (citations omitted).
Paul Vignos, Georgia Local Government Law: Court Resolution of County Government
Disagreements, 46 MERCER L. REV. 599, 607 (1994).
53 See discussion supra Part II.
54 See Roy Barnes, Opinion, How We Got Confederate Emblem Off Georgia’s Flag, CNN
(June 30, 2015, 3:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/30/opinions/barnes-georgiaconfederate-flag/index.html (“As governor of Georgia, I successfully pushed for the
replacement of that flag during our 2001 legislative session.”).
51
52

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

15

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 9
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

382

12/18/2018 10:59 AM

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:367

state flag, protections for other Confederate symbols and historical
objects were included as political compromise.55
The statute provides that:
“[n]o publicly owned monument . . . erected . . . or
maintained on the public property of this state or its
agencies . . . in honor of the military service of any past
or present military personnel of this State, . . . or the
Confederate States of America . . . shall be relocated,
removed, . . . or altered in any fashion . . . .”56
As written, the statute effectively preempts any local
government action as it concerns removing Confederate
monuments.57 In contrast to certain other statutes with similar
purposes throughout the South, the plain language of the statute
provides no process for removal,58 outside of a narrow exception in

55 See O.C.G.A. § 50-3-1 (2018) (entitled “Description and use of state flag; duty to carry;
preservation and protection of certain public monuments and memorials”); see also Michael
Jones, Petition Seeks Change In Ga. Law That Protects Confederate Monuments, WABE 90.1
FM
(Aug.
15,
2017),
https://www.wabe.org/petition-seeks-change-ga-law-protectsconfederate-monuments (“When Georgia took the Confederate battle symbol off the state
flag in 2001, part of the compromise lawmakers struck was a new state law that protected
Confederate memorials and monuments from being removed, relocated or even altered.”);
Lorraine Boissoneault, What Will Happen to Stone Mountain, America’s Largest
Confederate
Memorial?,
SMITHSONIAN.COM
(Aug.
22,
2017),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/what-will-happen-stone-mountain-americaslargest-confederate-memorial-180964588 (“‘[M]embers of the [Legislative Black Caucus]
weren’t completely comfortable with [the statute], but we thought that was a compromise to
make,’ says Lester Jackson, a Georgia state senator from Savannah. ‘Fast forward 15 years
and we need to go back and revisit that.’”).
56 O.C.G.A. § 50-3-1(b)(2) (2018) (emphasis added).
57 See Jake Reynolds, Georgia State Law Makes it Difficult to Completely Remove
Confederate Monuments, 13WMAZ (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.13wmaz.com/news/local/
georgia-state-law-makes-it-difficult-to-completely-remove-or-hide-confederate-monuments/
464932603 (“[Jim] Elliott [City Attorney in Warner Robbins, GA] . . . said it's important for
protestors, or others who do not support the monuments, to know that the state preempted
local government's action and has basically kept their hands tied when it comes to removing
statues and monuments.”); see also Jacyln Schultz, Legal Questions Loom Over Georgia
Confederate
Memorials,
FOX
5
ATLANTA
(Aug.
17,
2017,
12:57
AM),
http://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/legal-questions-loom-over-georgia-confederate-memorials
(“State Sen. Elena Parent of Decatur’s District 42 released the following statement: ‘My
hope is that the Senate Democratic caucus will file a bill in the 2018 legislative session to
change O.C.G.A. [Section] 50-3-1(b)(2) and allow local officials to determine if Confederate
memorials should be moved in their communities.’”).
58 See, e.g., Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of 2016, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412
(2018) (providing a process for a “public entity” to petition the controlling state agency to
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O.C.G.A. Section 50-3-1(b)(2), which states that “appropriate
measures for the preservation, protection, and interpretation of
such monuments or memorials shall not be prohibited.” While in
contrast to certain similar Southern statutes,59 the Georgia
statute’s outright prohibition of removal and lack of a separate
decision-making body, is representative of a small number of
statutes enacted recently throughout the South.60
Some believe that local Georgia officials could remove
monuments by claiming they are acting to preserve and protect
the monuments, “pointing to the recent violent rallies hosted by
white supremacists around these monuments.”61 Proponents of
this solution assert that officials would “have a leg to stand on” as
the public—and, presumably, a court—may be convinced that
removal is the only way to adequately protect the monument.62
While the stability of that leg is suspect at best, those exploring
legal avenues for removal are predominantly looking to the state
legislature to repeal or amend the 2001 statute63 which included
what was, at the time, thought to be an agreeable compromise.64
Predictably, the response from the legislature has been a mixed
bag. The controversy surrounding Confederate monuments and
attention directed at the restrictive statute at issue, O.C.G.A.
Section 50-3-1, did result in solutions that were to be proposed at
the 2018 legislative session.65 One draft bill, for example, proposed
waive protection of a monument so as to remove or relocate); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
171.780–.788 (West 2018) and discussion infra Part II.B.
59 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
60 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-165 (2018) (acting as a complete prohibition of
removal of monuments erected in remembrance of the “War Between the States”); VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-1812 (2018) (acting as a complete prohibition of removal of “Confederate or
Union” monuments).
61 Charlotte Norsworthy, Division on Broad Street: Confederate Monument in the Heart
of
Athens
Stirs
Controversy,
THE
RED
&
BLACK
(Aug.
24,
2017),
http://www.redandblack.com/athensnews/division-on-broad-street-confederate-monumentin-the-heart-of/article_e2d0184e-8879-11e7-982a-8faa013e2660.html.
62 Id.
63 See, e.g. Schultz, supra note 57.
64 See Boissoneault, supra note 55.
65 Greg Bluestein, Bipartisan Duo Proposes Compromise on Civil War Symbols After ‘Go
Missing’ Warning Sparks Controversy, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Sep. 27, 2017),
http://politics.blog.myajc.com/2017/09/27/bipartisan-duo-proposes-compromise-on-civil-warsymbols-after-go-missing-warning-sparks-controversy (“Their proposal would allow local
communities to decide whether Civil War monuments should remain on their grounds,
overhauling a provision . . . that makes it illegal to ‘relocate, remove, conceal or obscure’ any
Confederate memorial.”).
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to allow localities to decide whether Confederate monuments
remain on public property.66 Under this draft bill, if the locality
decides that removal is proper, then it may sell or auction it to a
private party or, if no buyer can be found, Stone Mountain will
function as a repository for otherwise unwanted monuments.67
Similarly, others have sought to tackle the problem by introducing
“legislation [that] would simply return this decision making
authority to Georgia’s cities and counties and provide more local
control.”68
Upon introduction, some—including current Democratic
members of the Georgia House—were dubious that this type of bill
would pass in the near future.69 However, conservative members of
state government, including Governor Nathan Deal, expressed a
willingness to reconsider the issue.70 In a September 2017
statement, Governor Deal acknowledged that any response from
the government must bear in mind the appropriate allocation of
authority to localities, stating: “I think [state legislators] will do a
pretty in-depth look into whether or not we should continue to
restrict local jurisdictions—counties and cities—in terms of what
they may want to consider in their areas.”71 Despite these
assurances, however, the bills were not introduced during the

Id.
Id.; see also Wes Wolfe, Bill Could Put Confederate Monuments on the Move, THE
BRUNSWICK NEWS (Sep. 28, 2017), http://thebrunswicknews.com/news/local_news/bill-couldput-confederate-monuments-on-the-move/article_c3c58f40-0c8d-5958-bd2cb15c15402566.html (“(Local governments) can do one of two things in this bill [if removal is
desired] . . . they can decide to move [the monument] to an interested private party [or] send
the monument to Stone Mountain [which] would serve as a repository.”).
68 Stanley Dunlap, Two Georgia Legislators Want Local Governments Decide Fate of
Confederate Memorials, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 20, 2017, 11:45 AM), http://www.macon.com/
news/state/georgia/article185263078.html; see also Dan Whisenhunt, State Rep. Mary
Margaret Oliver Pre-Files Bill to Allow for Removal of Confederate Monuments,
DECATURISH (Nov. 16, 2017), https://decaturish.com/2017/11/state-rep-mary-margaretoliver-pre-files-bill-to-allow-for-removal-of-confederate-monuments (“Citizens . . . of Decatur
and DeKalb have voiced their opinions and asked me to introduce legislation to allow local
governments to . . . remove or modify monuments that are located in public spaces, [State
Rep. Mary Margaret] Oliver said in an email.”).
69 See Jones, supra note 55 (“‘I know that from the governor’s office, down to the House
and Senate leadership that they’re not too keen on pulling the trigger to make that [change]
happen,’ state [Rep.] Howard Mosby (D-Atlanta) said in August.”).
70 See Bluestein, supra note 65 (“Gov. Nathan Deal said in a recent interview he expects
lawmakers to take a ‘serious look’ at how to handle monuments, memorials and street signs
commemorating the Confederacy.”).
71 Id.
66

67
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spring 2018 legislative session.72 One bill sponsor claimed that
Republican leadership did not want to address the legislation, and
some blamed the reticence to take on such a controversial topic on
the fact that 2018 is an election year.73
B. KENTUCKY’S STATUTE: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. SECTIONS 171.780–.788.

As signed into law in March 2002,74 the “Kentucky Military
Heritage Act” prescribes a substantially different process than
Georgia’s statute for protection, and potential removal, of
Confederate monuments.75 Split into five sections, the Act first
establishes the Kentucky Military Heritage Commission (the
“Commission”) as an independent agency and grants the agency
near-absolute control over monument protection.76 Under the Act,
any person or organization may nominate an object for designation
as a “military heritage object,” and members of the Commission
decide, by majority vote, whether to accept the object to the
registry of Kentucky military heritage sites and objects significant
to the military history of Kentucky.77 Designation of an object as a
military heritage object then confers certain protections upon the
object: “the object cannot be destroyed, removed, sold, or
significantly altered . . . without the written consent of the
[C]ommission.”78 Once accepted as a military heritage object, “a
unanimous vote of the members of the commission” is required to

72 Mimi Kirk, What Should I Do With My Family’s Confederate Hero?, CITYLAB (Apr. 10,
2018),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/what-should-i-do-with-my-familysconfederate-hero/556337.
73 See id. (“[I]t’s also an election year, making controversial bills even less likely to be
taken up.”).
74 KENTUCKY GOVERNOR’S MESSAGE, 3/14/2002 (“AN ACT relating to the Kentucky
Military Heritage Act.”).
75 In further contrast to Georgia’s controlling statute, the passage and signing of the bill
by the Kentucky state government received little to no media attention at the time of
passage, outside of that from the Kentucky chapter of Confederate Veterans who found the
signing to be cause for “celebration.” The Kentucky Military Heritage Act: Putting It to Work
Preserving History, THE JOURNAL OF THE KENTUCKY DIVISION, SONS OF CONFEDERATE
VETERANS (Apr. 23, 2010) (originally published in 2004), http://thelostcauseky.blogspot.com/
2010/04/kentucky-military-heritage-act-putting.html (“On March 12th, 2002, surrounded by
SCV members, legislators and others . . . , Governor Patton signed into law the Kentucky
Military Heritage Act. It was the culmination of two years’ hard work by many people, and
signing day was truly a celebration.”).
76 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.782 (West 2018).
77 See id. §§ 171.784(1), (2), (6).
78 See id. § 171.786(2).
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revoke the protective designation.79 If a Confederate monument is
not so designated, then decisions to remove a monument are
within the discretion of local officials.80
A recent highly-publicized and successful attempt by the city of
Lexington, Kentucky to remove two prominent monuments
associated with the Confederacy has raised questions about the
Commission and the inner-workings of the statute.81 In accordance
with the administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to the
Kentucky Military Heritage Act, if the Commission receives an
application to designate a publicly owned monument as a “military
heritage object,” it must notify the public “owner” and can either
“submit a written agreement with, or objection to, the
application.”82 This extra step thus allows the locality to
participate in the designation process, either agreeing or objecting
to the proposed designation.83 The two Lexington monuments of
Kentuckian Confederate figures84 were previously thought to be
properly designated as military heritage objects.85 Upon review,
See id. § 171.784(7).
See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Ky. Div. v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro
Government,
No.
16-CI-2009
(Jefferson
Circuit
Court,
June
15,
2016),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/316250827/Judge-s-ruling-in-Confederate-monument#
fullscreen&from_embed (denying an injunction of removal of prominent Confederate
monument in Louisville, KY, holding: “As the monument is not designated as a military
heritage object by the Kentucky Military Heritage Commission, it is afforded no protection
under [the Kentucky Military Heritage Act].”); see also Callan v. Fischer, 3:16-CV-734, 2016
WL 6886870 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 19, 2016) (denying motion for Temporary Restraining Order
filed to prevent removal of the same monument which was the subject of the state court
case until the Kentucky Military Heritage Commission could hold its next meeting to
consider a newly filed application for designation of the monument as a military heritage
object).
81 See Musgrave & Brammer, supra note 28.
82 Procedure for Kentucky Military Heritage Nomination, Designation, and Rescission,
202 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 8:030 § 2(8)(b) (2004).
83 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.784 (West 2018); 202 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 8:030 § 2(8)(b)
(2004).
84 The first, John Hunt Morgan, was “known as the ‘Thunderbolt of the Confederacy’ and
remembered as the ideal of the romantic Southern cavalryman.” See Biography: John Hunt
Morgan, CIVIL WAR TRUST, https://www.civilwar.org/learn/biographies/john-hunt-morgan
(last visited Sep. 3, 2018). The second, John C. Breckinridge, was a former Vice President of
the United States and U.S. Senator who served as Secretary of War for the Confederacy.
See generally WILLIAM C. DAVIS, BRECKINRIDGE: STATESMAN, SOLDIER, SYMBOL (Louisiana
State University Press 1974) (2010).
85 See Musgrave & Brammer, supra note 28 (“The two statues were put under the
commissions’ control in May 2004, according to documents . . . received through an Open
Records Act request. . . . Samuel Flora, president of the local chapter of the Sons of
Confederate Veterans, filed a petition with the [C]ommission to put the two statues under
79
80
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however, Lexington Mayor Jim Gray and Kentucky Attorney
General Andy Beshear, claimed to have found they were not.86 “We
discovered the city council did not authorize the mayor to give up
local authority to the state Military Heritage Commission in 2003 .
. . . That action wasn’t lawful, and it is void. The Attorney General
confirmed our finding this morning. That means our local
authority remains intact,” Gray said.87 After announcing the
alleged flaw in designation and resolving that the city had
retained authority over the monuments, city officials began
removing the monuments the same day.88
Whether the alleged flaw in designation of these monuments as
military heritage monuments did in fact render their designation
unlawful, meaning that “local authority remains intact,” remains
to be seen.89 One thing is clear: had the designation been proper,
under the Kentucky Military Heritage Act, the Commission would
have had the ultimate say.90 However, this is no consolation for
some in the Kentucky state legislature, and recently-introduced
bills intend to further restrict local authority over historical
monuments in the state.91
C. LEGAL PROCESS TO REMOVE IN OTHER SOUTHERN STATES

In contrast to the strict legal process required to remove
monuments in states like Georgia and Kentucky, the removal of
Confederate monuments can be swift, covert, and arguably
its auspices in June 2003. Then-Mayor Teresa Isaac signed Flora’s petition to the
[C]ommission.”).
86 Morgan Eads, et. al., In a Surprise Move, Lexington Removes Controversial
Confederate Statues, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Oct. 17, 2017, 6:46 PM),
http://www.kentucky.com/news/local/counties/fayette-county/article179392076.html.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See id. (acknowledging “potential litigation” which could follow in the aftermath of the
Attorney General and mayor finding that the assent to designation was not lawful).
90 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.784(7) (West 2018) (“[T]o rescind the designation of an
object as a military heritage object requires a unanimous vote of the members of the
commission.”).
91 See Jack Brammer, Lawmaker was ‘Sick’ When Confederate Statues Moved. His Bill
Would Make It Harder, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Jan. 12, 2018, 5:18 PM),
http://www.kentucky.com/news/politics-government/article194378369.html (“[State Rep. C.
Wesley] Morgan’s legislation — House Bill 54 — would set up a Committee on Monument
Protection to oversee statues and monuments on all property owned or leased by the state
or any county, municipal or metro government” and would presumptively protect all
monuments, not requiring any prior designation).
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paternalistic in states where there is no controlling statute.92 A
dispute in New Orleans over the removal of four Confederate
monuments is particularly illustrative of the interplay between
state and local authorities where there is no controlling statute. In
the direct aftermath of the massacre at Emanuel AME Church in
Charleston, South Carolina, New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu
called for the removal of four Confederate monuments, formally
asking the City Council to pass an ordinance classifying the
monuments as public nuisances.93 In December 2015, the New
Orleans City Council affirmatively voted (6-1) to remove the
monuments,94 and the monuments, now recognized as public
nuisances, were slated for removal.95
Throughout the process, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal
opposed removal of the monuments.96 A statement from his office
indicated that he “instructed his staff to look into the Heritage Act
to determine the legal authority he has as governor to stop it.”97
However, a review of state laws revealed that, in contrast to other
Southern states, Louisiana had no “heritage act.”98 In the absence
92 See, e.g., Nicholas Fandos, et. al., Baltimore Mayor Had Statues Removed in ‘Best
Interest of My City’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/
us/baltimore-confederate-statues.html (“‘It was ‘in the best interest of my city,’ [Baltimore]
Mayor Catherine Pugh said Wednesday, as she explained why she ordered Confederate
monuments removed under the cover of darkness . . . ‘[W]ith the climate of this nation . . . I
think it’s very important that we move quickly and quietly.’”).
93 Daniel Victor, New Orleans City Council Votes to Remove Confederate Monuments,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/us/new-orleans-city-counilconfederate-monuments-vote.html?_r=0.
94 Id.
95 Landrieu invoked a 1993 ordinance, Article VII § 146.611, that gave the City
Council authority to declare public monuments nuisances and have them removed. That
ordinance sets up a three-part test to determine if a monument may be removed. To
remove, the council must find that the monument: (1) “[p]raises a subject at odds with
the message of equal rights under the law”; (2) “[h]as been or may become the site of
violent demonstrations”; and (3) “[c]onstitutes an expense to maintain that outweighs its
historic importance and/or the reason for its display on public property.” Robert
McClendon, Mitch Landrieu Invokes Public ‘Nuisance’ Ordinance for Confederate
Monuments, NOLA.COM (July 9, 2015, 9:14 AM), http://www.nola.com/politics/
index.ssf/2015/07/mitch_ landrieu_confederate_rem.html.
96 See Jeff Adelson, Four Confederate Statues in New Orleans Recommended for
Removal, but Bobby Jindal Trying to Block the Move, THE NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE (Aug.
16, 2015, 4:42 PM), http://www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/politics/article_
eaaa8bab-229a-5f5c-9f4d-111d73122ac8.html (describing an email from the Governor’s
office that stated: “Governor Jindal opposes the tearing down of these historical statues”).
97 Id.
98 Jeff Adelson, ‘Heritage Act’ Cited by Bobby Jindal Admin to Defend Confederate
Statues Apparently Doesn’t Exist, NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE (Aug. 16, 2015, 4:42 PM),
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of such a law, the state government acknowledged there was
nothing it could do “to interfere with decisions Mayor Mitch
Landrieu and the City Council make about monuments on
property that the city owns.”99 Various organizations sued to
enjoin the city from removing the monuments, but none were
successful.100 In the end, the District Court for Eastern District of
Louisiana recognized that such public nuisance ordinances were
“squarely within the City’s police powers”101 and that “the City has
authority to remove the Monuments because they are located on
public property.”102
The vigorous public backlash to removal evidences how hotbutton an issue Confederate monuments have become in recent
years.103 The backlash further illustrates the starkly contrasting
opinions in the South between progressive cities, such as New
Orleans, and more rural areas throughout the South. One poll
taken by Louisiana State University showed that “[a]lmost three
out of every four [73%] Louisiana residents oppose removing
Confederate monuments and symbols from public space.” 104 In
2017, the Louisiana state legislature introduced a bill to protect
Confederate monuments from removal but, after advancing
through the House with a vote of 65-31,105 the bill died in the

http://www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/politics/article_dadcd6f0-da16-58fb-a0848c5c678815da.html.
99 Id.
100 See Kevin Litten, Confederate Monuments: Court Rejects Attempt to Halt Beauregard
Removal, NOLA.COM (May 10, 2017), https://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/05/
beauregard_monument_injunction_1.html (detailing the efforts of the Monumental Task
Committee and others to prevent the removal of the New Orleans monuments).
101 Monumental Task Comm., Inc. v. Foxx, 240 F. Supp. 3d 487, 494–95 (E.D. La. 2017)
(citations omitted).
102 Monumental Task Comm., Inc. v. Foxx, 259 F. Supp. 3d 494, 508 (E.D. La. 2017).
103 See Victor, supra note 93 (“The opposition to the monuments’ removal—in op-ed
articles, social media posts and shouting at public meetings—was vigorous.”).
104 Julia O’Donoghue, Louisiana Residents Oppose Confederate Monument Removal by a
Wide Margin, NOLA.COM (Apr. 18, 2016, 7:42 PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/
2016/04/confederate_monuments.html (noting further that “[t]he LSU survey also found
that more African Americans opposed monument removal, 47 percent, than supported it,
40 percent”).
105 Drew Broach, To Protect Monuments, Here’s How Louisiana House Voted, NOLA.COM
(May 15, 2017), https://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/05/confederate_monument_
house_vote.html.
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Senate and Governmental Affairs Committee which voted 4-2 to
scrap the House-backed bill.106
That “[t]he struggle for local control over public decisions has
characterized
the American experiment
in democratic
government”107 has possibly never rung more true than in relation
to controversial social issues such as this. Confederate
monuments, and the strong beliefs and emotions surrounding the
debate over their removal, expose tensions between state and local
authorities. In light of these tensions, the question remains: how
devolved is too devolved?

106 Melinda Deslatte, La. Senators Reject Confederate Monument Protection Bills, U.S.
NEWS (May 31, 2017, 8:21 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/louisiana/
articles/2017-05-31/la-senators-reject-confederate-monument-protection-bills (nothing that
“[a]ll four Democratic senators who voted against the bills are black. Two white Republican
senators supported the measures.”).
107 See KRANE ET AL., supra note 29.
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IV. LEGAL AND POLICY ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO LOCALITIES
Since this nation’s conception, the question of where
governmental power should lie—the federal government, states,
localities?—has been one of great difficulty.108 There are numerous
arguments on either side of the debate concerning the appropriate
degree of delegation to localities. This Note seeks to capture the
main arguments on both sides that are relevant in the context of
controversial social issues like removal of Confederate
monuments.
A. ARGUMENTS AGAINST DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

The arguments regarding where governmental power should lie
have been articulated at critical junctures in our nation’s
history.109 Supporters of state authority make two main arguments
in support of more centralized authority: 1) centralized authority
is necessary to protect against the “mischiefs of faction” and 2)
statewide uniformity of regulation for certain significant issues is
a desirable policy goal.
1. Centralized Authority is Necessary to Protect Against the
“Mischiefs of Faction.”
Perhaps no argument for centralized authority is more
prevalent than that of James Madison in Federalist No. 10. The
Federalist Papers constituted a project whose “immediate object . .
. was to vindicate & recommend the new Constitution to the State
of [New York] . . . .”110 Federalist No. 10 is one of the most
108 The impetus for debate over proper delegation of authority is not limited to
controversial social issues but includes economic and military issues as well. While there is
overlap with these arguments and considerations, they are mostly outside the scope of this
Note. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 476 (2d
ed. 1998) (discussing Federalists blaming many evils of society, including “the breakdown of
authority, the increase of debt . . . [e]ven the difficulties of the United States in foreign
affairs,” on the disorganized, decentralized politics of the pre-1789 Constitution United
States).
109 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 523 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“An acute awareness of the heightened danger of oppression from political
factions in small, rather than large, political units dates to the very beginning of our
national history.”).
110 Letter from James Madison to James K. Paulding (July 23, 1818), in 8 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 410, 410 (Galliard Hunt ed., 1908).
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discussed essays within the collection,111 and devotes itself to
considering the benefits of allocating authority to a more
centralized government to help account for “the mischiefs of
faction,”112 thus necessarily reducing powers of smaller
communities. Madison articulated the concept as follows:
Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of
parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common
motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it
to discover their own strength and to act in unison
with each other.113
The danger of factions is that the political process will devolve
to the point that “measures are too often decided, not according to
the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.”114 “[A]t
the local level, the dominating faction can become a permanent
majority, lording its power over opposing factions without
bothering to [compromise with opposing groups].”115
These concerns have been realized throughout U.S. history, and
the struggle for racial equality in the South is one of the most
memorable instances.116 A particularly vivid example is when the
federal government required the integration of schools117 and the
111 Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the
Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 818 (2007)
(discussing essays which merit special attention, “like No. 10, which many academic works
discuss”); see also Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: AntiFederalism from the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 74, 100
(1989) (“Everyone is . . . tediously aware of the Federalist argument that we need a large
republic as a safeguard against faction.”).
112 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
113 Id. at 83.
114 Id. at 77.
115 Carol M. Rose, What Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1681, 1687 (2007).
116 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 523 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[R]acial discrimination against any group finds a more ready expression at the state and
local than at the federal level. To the children of the Founding Fathers, this should come as
no surprise.”).
117 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495, (1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (“Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the
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then-governor of the state of Alabama, George Wallace, refused to
integrate, citing “the constitutional right of states to operate public
schools, colleges and universities.”118 Integration was only
accomplished after President John F. Kennedy federalized the
Alabama National Guard, forcing Wallace to relent.119 This
example, involving an extremely controversial social issue of the
twentieth century, illustrates the frequent need “to refine and
enlarge the public views.”120
2. There is a Policy Need for Statewide Uniformity of Regulation
for Certain Significant Issues.
Proponents of limited delegation of authority to localities also
argue for statewide uniformity of regulation regarding significant
social issues.121 For statewide uniformity to be beneficial from a
policy standpoint, two premises are necessary.122 First, the state
legislature must have the “willingness and ability to craft a law
that assures ‘informed and realistic expectations’ for the
parties.”123 The reality is that state legislatures are not
particularly concerned with many localized and non-controversial
issues.124 With such issues, there is little harm where states allow
localities to exercise “their own localized judgments.”125

actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
118 Debbie Elliot, Wallace in the Schoolhouse Door: Marking the 40th Anniversary of
Alabama’s
Civil
Rights
Standoff,
NPR
(June
11,
2003,
12:00
AM),
http://www.npr.org/2003/06/11/1294680/wallace-in-the-schoolhouse-door.
119 See John F. Romano, State Militias and the United States: Changed Responsibilities
for a New Era, 56 A.F. L. REV. 233, 246 (2005) (“[F]ederal officials, supported by the
National Guard, confronted Governor Wallace at the door of the University of Alabama and
enforced the federal court's order of integration.”).
120 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
121 Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial
Scrutiny, 86 Denv. U.L. Rev. 1337, 1352 (2009) (“Not surprisingly, the need for statewide
uniformity and concerns about extraterritorial effects of local decisions loom large as factors
in home rule analyses.”).
122 See City of Longmont v. Colorado Oil & Gas Ass'n, 369 P.3d 573, 580 (Colo. 2016)
(“[W]e have said that, although uniformity in itself is no virtue, it is necessary ‘when it
achieves and maintains specific state goals.’”) (quoting City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d
151, 160 (Colo. 2003)).
123 See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 121, at 1352.
124 See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 36-34-5.3 (2018) (allowing certain state municipalities to enter
into leases and contracts with private entities for the operation of private zoos).
125 See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 121, at 1353.
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Moreover, delegation of certain issues to local authorities may
result in a government that is more responsive to the needs and
concerns of its citizens.126 However, that a state is “unwilling” to
act does not necessarily indicate apathy.127 Where localities step in
to fill the void on a variety of social issues, “many . . . have found
themselves increasingly at odds with their states, and . . . in a
region that remains the most conservative in the country, the
conflicts are growing more frequent and particularly pitched.”128
Second, non-uniform local laws and regulations must have
deleterious extraterritorial effects if statewide uniformity is to be a
benefit.129 The concern here is that the local law-making locality
will not be fully accountable if there are extraterritorial effects on
outside citizens, even within the same state.130 “There will . . . be .
. . obvious cases where a city is clearly seeking to externalize costs
to other cities, such as . . . draconian bans on sex-offender
registry.”131 Another concern with extraterritorial effects is that
“widespread local regulation will produce a maze of varying and
potentially inconsistent regulations by other similarly situated
home rule municipalities, the extraterritorial impact [lying] in the
patchwork or the confusion resulting from ‘a significant variety of
conflicting local legislation.’”132 If the above two premises hold
126 See Lawrence Rosenthal, Romer v. Evans as the Transformation of Local Government
Law, 31 URB. LAW. 257, 274-75 (1999) (“Indeed, the primary benefit claimed by advocates
of local government is that decentralization of power will provide greater opportunities for
discrete communities to make their government more responsive to their needs.”).
127 See Robertson & Fausset, supra note 17 (“Across Mississippi, cities, counties and
public institutions have responded to the Legislature’s unwillingness to take the
Confederate battle cross out of the state flag by refusing to fly the flag altogether.”); see also
Maxwell L. Steams, Direct (Anti-) Democracy, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 311, 352 (2012) (“The
reluctance of state legislatures in the South . . . to embrace needed reforms during the
period of racially segregated schools . . . motivated the NAACP to pursue a strategy of
favorable case orderings targeting important changes in Supreme Court doctrine.”).
128 See Robertson & Fausset, supra note 17.
129 See Baker and Rodriguez, supra note 121, at 1353 (“Extraterritorial impact has
considerable traction and appeal as a home rule criterion; it is difficult to see municipal
legislation as dealing with purely local concerns when it . . . affects individuals outside the
municipality.”).
130 See, e.g., Diller, supra note 17, at 1069–70 (“[I]f a county loosens gun regulations, its
voters may argue that they are doing so because allowing more guns in the hands of lawabiding citizens leads to less crime. Urban areas in the state are likely to disagree and . . .
claim that they will be on the receiving end of the negative externality of loose gun sales.”).
131 Id.
132 Laurie Reynolds, Home Rule, Extraterritorial Impact, and the Region, 86 DENV. U.L.
REV. 1271, 1279 (2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (citing City of Commerce
City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1281 (Colo. 2002)).
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true, statewide uniformity is a persuasive argument against
delegation of authority from states to localities.
B. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

Recent scholarship has increasingly argued in favor of
delegation of authority to localities.133 These arguments for
delegation, like those cautioning against delegation in Federalist
No. 10,134 have been made throughout the history of the United
States. Supporters of increased delegation of authority make three
main arguments: (1) centralized government lacks the ability to
adequately and quickly address important issues; (2) increased
local authority fosters civic involvement; and (3) delegating
authority to localities allows for increased innovation and
experimentation.
1. Centralized Government Lacks the Ability to Adequately and
Quickly Address Important Issues.
Many commentators consider Democracy in America by Alexis
de Tocqueville to be a response to Federalist No. 10’s argument in
favor of centralized government.135 De Tocqueville, believing that
“municipal institutions constitute the strength of free nations,”136
argues that centralization succeeds “in subjecting the external
actions of men to a certain uniformity, . . . [and] excels in
prevention, but not in action.”137 He asserts that “when society is
133 See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (3rd ed. 2001) (discussing
the “tradition” of “American intellectuals” who “point to cities as the ‘hope of democracy’”);
Diller, supra note 17, at 1048 (“[T]his Article posits that local lawmaking in urban areas
may serve as a modest corrective and shift the cumulative local, state, and national legal
framework back toward the views of the national median voter.”). But see Rosenthal, supra
note 126, at 257 (“In the discussion that follows, I will . . . show that Romer’s holding cannot
be reconciled with the traditional rule that state governments have plenary authority to
decide what powers to confer on their local governments . . . .”).
134 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
135 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Francis Bowen ed., Henry Reeve
trans., 1948); see also Williams, supra note 133, at 1183 (“[The] pro-centralization excerpt is
James Madison's Federalist No. 10, which extols the virtues of centralization as an effective
way to avoid ‘faction’ and to ensure a large enough arena so that fine leaders can emerge.
The pro-decentralization position is a series of excerpts from de Tocqueville’s Democracy
in America that praise democracy over aristocracy and monarchy, and that praise towns in
particular (‘it is man who makes monarchies and establishes republics, but the town
seem[s] to come directly from the hand of God’).”) (citations omitted).
136 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 135, at 61.
137 Id. at 90.
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to be profoundly moved, or accelerated in its course . . . the secret
of [centralization’s] impotence is disclosed.”138
The superior responsiveness of local officials to local needs and
issues is one of the primary arguments in favor of delegation of
authority.139 Indeed, “[a]t the local level, . . . minorities frequently
are found in numbers disproportionate to their representation in
the statewide population.”140 Thus, “it should come as little
surprise that local governments will frequently be more responsive
to [minorities’] concerns than the state will be.”141
Commentators have interpreted a Supreme Court case, Romer
v. Evans, as allowing potential for increased local authority. In
Romer, Colorado citizens and municipalities sued to challenge the
constitutionality of a state constitutional amendment.142 The
amendment at issue was adopted by a statewide referendum in
response to Colorado municipalities’ recent passage of ordinances
banning discrimination based on sexual orientation.143
Substantively, the amendment “preclude[d] all legislative,
executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local
government designed to protect the status of persons based on
their ‘homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships.’”144 The Supreme Court found that the
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause.145
This dispute about sexual orientation policies, which is clearly a
controversial social issue,146 illustrates the interplay between
Id.
See Rosenthal, supra note 126, at 274 (“[O]f course, presumably an important (if
not primary) reason for states to create and confer powers upon local governments is that
local officials are likely to be more knowledgeable about and responsive to local needs than
state officials.”); see also id. at 274–75 (“Indeed, the primary benefit claimed by advocates of
local government is that decentralization of power will provide greater opportunities for
discrete communities to make their government more responsive to their needs.”).
140 Id. at 274.
141 Id.
142 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 620 (1996) (describing the claimants as “aggrieved
homosexuals and municipalities”).
143 See id. at 623 (“The enactment challenged in this case is an amendment to the
Constitution of the State of Colorado, adopted in a 1992 statewide referendum.”).
144 Id. at 620.
145 Id.
146 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S 558, 562, 585 (2003) (holding that a Texas
statute criminalizing certain sexual conduct between members of the same sex violates the
Due Process Clause); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2588–89 (2015) (holding that
the Due Process Clause requires state recognition of same-sex marriage); Romer v. Evans,
138
139
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state and local authorities on such issues. As Justice Scalia noted
in his Romer dissent, “because those who engage in homosexual
conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain
communities, have high disposable income, and, of course, care
about homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the
public at large, they possess political power much greater than
their numbers, both locally and statewide.”147 This concentration
of political power results in governmental authorities, often large
liberal cities,148 that have the ability to quickly address
controversial, “hot-button” issues.149 But Justice Scalia pointed out
how this might be a problem: where a minority group
disproportionately possesses political power at a local level, that
group can use its political power to achieve political outcomes that
are clearly in opposition to the statewide majority’s preferences.150
Such minority groups’ possession of disproportionate power
might be classified as one of the “mischiefs of faction” which should
be checked by a more centralized authority.151 However, one
should hesitate to more broadly conclude that all large cities are
“prone to domination by factions” regarding social issues that are
distinct from prevention of sexual orientation discrimination.152

517 U.S. at 624 (“What gave rise to the statewide controversy was the protection the [city]
ordinances afforded to persons discriminated against by reason of their sexual
orientation.”); see also DANIEL COX, ET AL., A SHIFTING LANDSCAPE: A DECADE OF CHANGE IN
AMERICAN ATTITUDES ABOUT SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND LGBT ISSUES (2014),
https://www.prri.org/research/2014-lgbt-survey (outlining the shift in cultural and social
attitudes in the United States towards “LGBT issues”).
147 517 U.S. at 645–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
148 See Graham, Red State, Blue City, supra note 18 (“It makes sense that these
[localities], finding themselves . . . increasingly progressive, and politically disempowered,
would want to use local ordinances as a bulwark against conservative state and federal
policies.”).
149 See State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980) (“Local power should not be
paralyzed and critical problems should not remain unsolved while officials await a biennial
session of the Legislature in the hope of obtaining passage of a special grant of authority.”);
see also Fandos, supra note 92 (“It was ‘in the best interest of my city,’ [Baltimore] Mayor
Catherine Pugh said Wednesday, as she explained why she ordered Confederate
monuments removed under the cover of darkness . . . ‘[W]ith the climate of this nation . . . I
think it’s very important that we move quickly and quietly.’”).
150 See 517 U.S. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) and supra note 147.
151 See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.
152 John D. Echeverria, The Costs of Koontz, 39 VT. L. REV. 573, 602 (2015) (“Many cities
in the United States have substantially larger populations than some states. Moreover,
cities vary enormously in their political operations and structure, making it impossible to
generalize about whether they are prone to domination by factions. In some ways, the
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Moreover, there are safeguards on local government power today
that did not exist—at least not to the same degree—when Madison
first articulated his concerns about factions. One of these
safeguards is “exit—the ability to abandon something when
dissatisfied—[which] exists most distinctively at the local level.”153
As stated by Professor Carol M. Rose:
Faction would indeed be a local problem if voice were
the only safeguard against local oppression; in smaller
republics, minority voices can indeed be drowned out.
But where localities genuinely differ, and where it is
possible to move among them, oppression can be left
behind, and even a local penchant for redistribution is
muted.154
More simply stated, if you do not like it here, move.
2. Increased Local Authority Fosters Civic Involvement
One of the most basic benefits of increased authority at the local
level is the incentive it provides for people to become civically
involved.155 Alexis de Tocqueville recognized this involvement as
intrinsically beneficial, stating: “It is not the administrative, but
the political effects of decentralization that I most admire in
America.”156 Generally, local governments better provide
opportunities to become involved because of ease of accessibility
and lower costs of participation.157 In fact, the “need for local
democracy has grown as the federal and state governments have
grown more complex and access to them for the ordinary citizen
governments of New York City and Los Angeles are more like the U.S. government than
that of a small Vermont village.”) (citation omitted).
153 See Rose, supra note 111, at 97 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
154 Id. at 100.
155 See Briffault, supra note 34, at 258 (“People will bother to participate in local
government decision making only if local governments have real power over matters
important to local people. Local democracy thus requires local autonomy, much as local
autonomy advances the prospects for local democracy.”).
156 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 135, at 94; see also id. at 251 (“This ceaseless agitation
which democratic government has introduced into the political world influences all social
intercourse. I am not sure that, on the whole, this is not the greatest advantage of
democracy . . . .”).
157 See Briffault, supra note 34, at 258 (“Democratic participation is more possible at the
local level, where government bodies and public officials are more accessible and closer to
home than they are at the state or national levels.”).
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has become more difficult.”158 Ideally, increased civic involvement
produces a government characterized by an “all-pervading and
restless activity, a superabundant force, and an energy which is
inseparable from it and which may, however unfavorable
circumstances may be, produce wonders.”159
The apparent benefit of civic involvement is based on the
premise that all citizens can contribute and be heard. Where,
however, “factions are able to operate in concert more efficiently to
dominate the locality or its legislature,”160 it becomes possible for
localities to take actions that are directly contradictory to the
desires of the statewide majority—such as the New Orleans
removal of Confederate monuments.161
3. Delegating Authority to Localities Allows for Increased
Innovation and Experimentation.
A strong argument in favor of delegating authority is that
delegation affords states and localities the freedom to innovate and
act as laboratories to test the value of those innovations.162 States
have long been recognized for their potential to serve as
laboratories, so “surely the 3,000 counties and 15,000
municipalities [in the United States] provide logarithmically more
opportunities for innovation, experimentation, and reform.”163
This argument is particularly powerful because local governments
have been leaders in policy response regarding numerous issues,
including gay rights,164 electoral reform,165 term limits,166 and
public health.167
Id.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 135, at 252.
160 Francisco Valdes, Testing Democracy: Marriage Equality, Citizen-Lawmaking and
Constitutional Structure, 19 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 3, 31 (2010).
161 See O’Donoghue, supra note 104 and accompanying text.
162 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”).
163 Briffault, supra note 34, at 259; see also Matthew J. Parlow, Progressive PolicyMaking on the Local Level: Rethinking Traditional Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. &
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 371 (2008) (“[C]onceptually speaking, the principles underlying
federalism seem logically to apply not only to the relationship between the federal
government and the states, but also to that between the states and local governments.”).
164 See Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex
Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 148–53 (2005) (examining the role of local governments in the
national debate over the morality and legality of same-sex marriage).
158
159
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V. WHY SOUTHERN STATE LEGISLATURES SHOULD REASSESS
STATUTES PASSED IN RESPONSE TO CONCERNS OF CONFEDERATE
MONUMENT REMOVAL TO ALLOW FOR GREATER DELEGATION OF
AUTHORITY TO LOCALITIES AND CLEARER PROCESSES
The concept of home rule is complex.168 Similarly complex are
the emotions and beliefs surrounding removal of Confederate
monuments.169 It is evident that there are legitimate concerns and
benefits attendant with whichever degree of delegation states
confer to local jurisdictions.170 Policy responses at any level must
therefore carefully account for constituents’ wishes as well as
potential consequences of delegation.171 With these ends in mind, it
is clear that actions taken by both state legislatures and localities
have been lacking.
A. BALANCING CONSIDERATIONS

The statutes passed in Georgia and Kentucky are
representative of most statutes passed by Southern states to
prevent removal of Confederate monuments.172 There are several
important distinctions between the two statutes. First, for a
165 See Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1, 31
(2006) (examining local political innovations and their implications for both home rule and
political reforms).
166 See Patrick Basham, Assessing the Term Limits Experiment: California and Beyond,
Policy Analysis (Cato Institute), Aug. 2001, https://object.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa413.pdf
(“During [the 2000] elections, local term limits passed in California, Florida, Maryland, and
New Mexico, adding to the total of nearly 3,000 municipal offices and more than 17,000
local politicians already subject to term limits.”).
167 See generally Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of
Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 1219 (2014) (describing how cities’ smaller scale,
concentrated political preferences, and streamlined processes facilitate public health
innovation).
168 See Briffault, supra note 34, at 253 (“Home rule is a complex topic. Home rule takes
many legal forms and follows many models . . . [and] is . . . controversial for both scholars
and courts.”).
169 See Brophy, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
170 See supra Part IV.
171 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 170 (William Rehg trans., 2d ed. 1996) (1981) (“The
rational acceptability of results achieved in conformity with [democratic] procedure follows
from the institutionalization of interlinked forms of communication that, ideally speaking,
ensure that all relevant questions, issues, and contributions are brought up and processed
in discourses and negotiations on the basis of the best available information and
arguments.”).
172 See discussion supra Part III.
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monument to be protected in Kentucky, a citizen or group must
first petition for designation of the monument as a “military
heritage object.”173 The state commission must then approve such
designation by majority vote.174 In Georgia, however, all
monuments honoring the service of those from the “Confederate
States of America” are presumptively protected.175 Kentucky’s
decision not to presumptively protect all monuments, and instead
only protect those that a citizen or group cares to protect, seems to
avoid creating unnecessary conflicts.176
One can assume that certain citizens and groups aim to remove
the very monuments that others aim to protect. The inquiry now
shifts to the second major distinction between the two statutes:
how much autonomy localities should have to make these
decisions. Georgia’s statute acts more as a complete prohibition of
monument removal,177 while Kentucky’s affords more discretion to
localities.178 If a state legislature follows Georgia’s lead by
prohibiting local governments from having a say on this
controversial issue, frustrated citizens may seek other, more
destructive avenues to make themselves heard.179 Alternatively,
when the local government in Lexington, Kentucky sought to
remove two prominent Confederate monuments, it first held a
public forum, then decided by a city council vote.180 This process
173 See Procedure for Kentucky Military Heritage Nomination, Designation, and
Rescission, 202 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 8:030 (2018).
174 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.784(6) (West 2018) (“[T]o designate an object as a military
heritage object requires a majority vote of the members of the commission.”).
175 See O.C.G.A § 50-3-1(b)(2) (2018), infra notes 55-60, and accompanying text.
176 Additionally, this fosters civic involvement on the front end. Admittedly, such
involvement is not achieved through delegation to localities in this instance.
177 See discussion supra Part III.
178 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 171.780–.788 (West 2018).
179 See, e.g., Alex Horton, Protesters in North Carolina Topple Confederate Statue
Following
Charlottesville
Violence,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
14,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/08/14/protesters-in-northcarolina-topple-confederate-statue-following-charlottesvilleviolence/?utm_term=.9a0f5a6a017b ("A crowd toppled a bronze Confederate statue in front
of a county administrative building in Durham, N.C., on Monday evening, as throngs of
‘anti-fascist’ groups gathered there days after white nationalist-fueled violence turned fatal
in Virginia.”); John Bowden, Georgia Confederate Monument Damaged in Apparent Act of
Vandalism, THE HILL (Dec. 26, 2017, 7:01 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefingroom/news/366531-police-treating-georgia-confederate-monument-damage-as (“Police in
Rome, Ga., are investigating damage done to a Confederate monument in the town's
cemetery as vandalism . . . .”).
180 Shay McAlister, Confederate Statue Controversy Continues in Lexington, WHAS 11
(Aug. 15, 2017, 10:27 PM), http://www.whas11.com/news/local/confederate-statue-
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fostered substantial civic involvement at the local level and
featured a city council that was ultimately responsive to the
community’s sentiments.181
However, Kentucky’s statute also has its flaws. The Kentucky
statute only allows for token participation by local governments if
a monument has been properly designated as a “military heritage
object.”182 One of the main benefits of allocating more authority to
localities is that it fosters civic involvement.183 If only token
participation is possible at the local level, then citizens might also
become disillusioned, as people “bother to participate in local
government decision making only if local governments have real
power over matters important to local people.”184
On the other hand, completely devolved is too devolved. Just as
complete prohibition of removal can lead to public unrest,185
allocating absolute power to localities to remove monuments can
lead to rash, arguably paternalistic, decisions to remove
monuments,186 that might also be at odds with desires of the
public-at-large.187 New Orleans provides an example of where
action taken by a government was arguably at odds with public

controversy-continues-in-lexington-council-hears-fiery-comments-from-public/464689782
(detailing the public debate comment process that took place in Lexington city council
chambers prior to a city council vote on removal of the two monuments).
181 Lexington, Ky. Approves Plan to Move Confederate Monuments, CBS NEWS (Aug. 17,
2017 10:19 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lexington-kentucky-approves-plan-to-moveconfederate-monuments (“The proposal to relocate statues honoring Confederate officers
John Hunt Morgan and John C. Breckinridge won unanimous approval from the LexingtonFayette Urban County Council after nearly three hours of public testimony that
overwhelmingly supported the resolution.”).
182 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.784(7) (West 2018) (requiring “a unanimous vote of the
members of the commission” to subsequently rescind a designation of an object as a military
heritage object); see also Musgrave & Brammer, supra note 28 (“Lexington’s leaders spoke
with one voice Thursday about the need to remove two Confederate statues from the
grounds of the former Fayette County courthouse, but the decision ultimately lies with a
little-known state commission that meets twice a year.”).
183 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
184 Briffault, supra note 34, at 258.
185 See Horton, supra note 179 and accompanying text.
186 See Fandos et. al., supra note 92 (“With no immediate public notice, no fund-raising,
and no plan for a permanent location for the monuments once they had been excised — all
things city officials once believed they would need — the mayor watched in the wee hours
on Wednesday as contractors with cranes protected by a contingent of police officers lifted
the monuments from their pedestals and rolled them away on flatbed trucks.”).
187 See O’Donoghue, supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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desire, and costly litigation ensued.188 This is not to imply that
action taken in line with the desires of the majority forecloses the
potential for litigation. Instead, the New Orleans process, or lack
thereof, illustrates that it behooves legislatures to avoid
constructing a system where litigation is a private citizen’s only
recourse to make heard the views of the majority.
One must balance the desire for responsiveness with the desire
to protect against the “mischiefs of faction.” One must also balance
the desire for local government innovation with the desire for
uniformity. The best policy response is to adopt an approach that
acknowledges each consideration as legitimate, to weigh some
considerations more heavily than others, and aim to strike a
balance.
B. RECOMMENDED MODEL APPROACH

Using the Kentucky statute as a loose framework, the model
statute should first create an administrative agency to oversee
monument protection.189 Ideally, such an agency would serve as an
expert decision-making body that is fair, impartial, and more
insulated from political pressures than a legislative body would
be.190
Next, the statute should provide a four-step process for persons
or organizations to petition for specific monuments to be

188 See e.g., Monumental Task Comm., Inc. v. Foxx, 240 F. Supp. 3d 487, 490 (E.D. La.
2017) (“On December 17, 2015, the [New Orleans] City Council affirmatively voted to
remove the monuments, and the ordinance was signed into law. Plaintiffs filed suit on the
same day seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin the City from relocating the
monuments.”).
189 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 171.780–.788 (West 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 100-2.1
(2018); Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of 2016, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412 (2018).
Importantly, the statute must “clearly define those activities of executive agencies which
are rule-making or legislative, and require agencies to comply with specific procedures as a
precondition to the validity and enforceability of rules.” Anne K. Pecora, The Model State
Administrative Procedure Act: Planned Restraint on the Consolidation of Power by Executive
Branches of State Governments, 32 VILL. L. REV. 451, 467–68 (1987).
190 See In re Am. Waste & Pollution Control Co., 581 So. 2d 738, 741–42 (La. Ct. App.
1991) (“When acting as adjudicators, administrative officers should conduct themselves as
judges do . . . .[T]hey must realize the importance of the positions of public trust they hold
and endeavor, however difficult, to avoid any appearance of partiality or prejudgment of
matters either pending or to be pending before them.”). But see Henry P. Monaghan, First
Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1970) (“Administrative bodies,
particularly at a state level, are rarely so insulated; indeed, they are often seen primarily as
political organs.”).
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designated as protected. The first of these four steps, like
Kentucky’s designation process, should allow any person or
organization to “nominate” a monument for protection under the
statute.191 Second, upon the state agency’s receipt of a petition, the
locality in which the monument lies and the locality’s residents
should be given notice. This notice would allow the locality ample
time to assess the propriety of the proposed designation and to
respond to citizen support or opposition.
Third, the locality should respond to the state agency with its
agreement or disagreement with the “protected designation” and
its accompanying reasons. Consistent with respect for local
autonomy and desires for innovation, the locality should make its
decision however it sees fit, as long as the public is given
appropriate time to voice its views. Localities are thereby given
authority on the front end, allowing them to realize the benefits of
civic involvement and responsiveness to citizens, while avoiding
the feeling that the locality had no say in the protected status of a
monument.
Fourth, upon the locality’s consent, the state agency should
have the power to afford or deny designation of the monument by
majority vote. If the locality consents to designation and the state
agency refuses to do so, this refusal can be overcome by threefourths vote of the locality’s legislative branch. If the locality
disagrees with the designation and does not give its consent, that
is the end of the matter. Allowing a state agency to overrule the
locality’s negative decision would bring about the very same
danger of entirely disallowing local governments to have a say in
the matter.192
Once a monument is designated as protected, the process for
removal should mirror the four-step process for designation: (1) a
person or organization can petition for removal of the monument;
(2) notice should be given to the locality and its citizens; (3) the
locality should then vote for or against removal; and (4) the state
agency should vote for or against removal by majority vote,
allowing refusal of removal to be overridden by a three-fourths
191 See Procedure for Kentucky Military Heritage Nomination, Designation, and
Rescission, 202 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 8:030 (2018) (“A person or organization may nominate . . .
an object as a military heritage object by submitting a ‘Military Heritage Commission
Historic Military Sites and Objects Application for Registration’ form to the Historic
Military Sites Preservation Coordinator at the Kentucky Heritage Council.”).
192 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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vote of the locality’s legislative branch. The clarity of the process in
and of itself will help allay concerns of those on either side of the
removal debate, in addition to offering the previously-discussed
policy benefits.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note suggests a model statutory approach for states to use
to protect and remove Confederate monuments. Importantly, the
model approach provides for meaningful political involvement at
both the state and local level. The engagement of the local
government at each relevant stage seeks to create a process that is
responsive to the concerns of the local citizenry, allows for political
innovation by localities, and, accordingly, fosters local civic
involvement. At the same time, the existence of the state agency
acts to protect against the mischiefs of faction in ensuring an
orderly, transparent process and, further, acknowledges the
statewide implications of any actions taken concerning
Confederate monuments. In this way, the model approach
balances the benefits of devolution against the downsides of more
local control and encourages parties on either side of the debate to
pursue their goals via orderly political avenues, in lieu of
extralegal actions performed “under the cover of darkness.”193

193 See Fondos, supra note 92 (explaining why the Baltimore Mayor Catherine Pugh had
certain Confederate monuments removed “under the cover of darkness”).
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